Decentralized Caching for Content Delivery Based on Blockchain: A Game
  Theoretic Perspective by Wang, Wenbo et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
07
60
4v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 23
 Ja
n 2
01
8
Decentralized Caching for Content Delivery Based
on Blockchain: A Game Theoretic Perspective
Wenbo Wang∗, Dusit Niyato∗, Ping Wang∗ and Amir Leshem†
∗School of Computer Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798
†Faculty of Engineering, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel, 52900
Abstract—Blockchains enables tamper-proof, ordered logging
for transactional data in a decentralized manner over open-
access, overlay peer-to-peer networks. In this paper, we propose
a decentralized framework of proactive caching in a hierarchical
wireless network based on blockchains. We employ the blockchain-
based smart contracts to construct an autonomous content caching
market. In the market, the cache helpers are able to autonomously
adapt their caching strategies according to the market statistics
obtained from the blockchain, and the truthfulness of trustless
nodes are financially enforced by smart contract terms. Further,
we propose an incentive-compatible consensus mechanism based
on proof-of-stake to financially encourage the cache helpers to
stay active in service. We model the interaction between the
cache helpers and the content providers as a Chinese restaurant
game. Based on the theoretical analysis regarding the Nash
equilibrium of the game, we propose a decentralized strategy-
searching algorithm using sequential best response. The simulation
results demonstrate both the efficiency and reliability of the
proposed equilibrium searching algorithm.
Index Terms—Caching, blockchain, proof-of-stake, Chinese
restaurant game
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the latest Cisco VNI report [1], over the past
5 years the global mobile data traffic has grown 18-fold,
which is largely driven by the explosive growth of the on-
demand mobile video traffic. In contrast, it is predicted that
the mobile network connection speed will only increase 3-
fold in the next 5 years. Motivated by the fact that most
mobile traffics are asynchronous but repetitive content delivery
requests, the research communities have vastly investigated
the technique of proactive caching in recent years [2]–[4]. In
general, proactive caching consists of two stages. The first
stage is the prefetching stage, where the edge servers such
as Wi-Fi Access Points (APs) and Small-Cell Base Stations
(SCBSs), or even Device-to-Device (D2D)-enabled nodes pre-
download/replicate the contents from the Content Servers (CSs)
before the content requests are posted by any mobile users.
The second stage is the delivery stage, where the contents are
delivered to the mobile users via the fronthaul or D2D links
from the caching nodes. A recent line of works has shown that
proactive caching is able to relieve the backhaul congestion [2],
reduce the cost of the content providers [3] and/or improve the
Quality of Experience (QoE) of the mobile users [4].
With the goals of offloading the heavy traffic and ensuring
delivery in case of high volatility, proactive caching at the
APs/SCBSs in wireless networks shares a lot of similarities
with the commercial Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) [5].
However, due to the limited resource in storage, computation
power and edge-to-end capacity, an AP/SCBS can only afford
caching a subset of the contents from the Content Providers
(CPs). Then, how to properly select the contents for proactive
caching becomes a vital challenge for the edge nodes, namely,
Cache Helpers (CHs). Moreover, due to the self-deployment
nature of the CHs and the coexistence of multiple CPs, it
is impractical to deploy or coordinate the accounting/broking
servers which are required by the logical system of a traditional
CDN [5] for transaction auditing and traffic estimation. As
a result, no trusted entity in the network audits the content
access/delivery or enforces the proper payments to the right
parties (e.g., CPs and CHs). Therefore, new expectations are set
for a decentralized, self-organized proactive caching system:
(1) The brokering and accounting processes between the CPs
and CHs should be achieved in a decentralized market,
with truthfulness being ensured for both parties.
(2) The CHs should be able to adapt to the changes of
content demand/supply in the network without access to a
centralized content delivery accounting server.
(3) The processes of cache selection and delivery allocation
should remain transparent to the mobile users.
(4) Proper incentive mechanisms should be provided to sustain
self-motivated content caching among the APs/SCBSs.
In this paper, we jointly address the challenges above by
constructing an autonomous content-caching market with a
smart contract-enabled blockchain. The blockchain serves as a
public immutable ledger without any centralized mediator in a
logical Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network [6]. The transaction records
between blockchain users are jointly approved by the consensus
nodes and digitally stored in their local blockchain replicas.
With the blockchain, the content prefetching and delivering
processes are self-organized in the form of smart contracts [7].
The blockchain also provides publicly accessible records about
the demand and supply of contents in the network. By jointly
considering the CHs’ activities in smart contract execution and
block consensus maintenance, we adopt a cross-layer design
for the blockchain’s consensus mechanism based on Proof-of-
Stake (PoS) [8]. Compared with the existing centralized caching
systems, the key advantages of the proposed mechanism are:
• Without a centralized auditor, the blockchain maintains a
publicly auditable transaction record. By querying it, the
CHs are able to autonomously learn the market state and
adapt their caching strategies accordingly.
• The smart contracts use financial incentive to ensure the
interests of different parties in a trustless caching market.
• The proposed consensus protocol financially incentivizes
the CHs to stay active in their service while securing the
blockchain consistency with little resource consumption.
We model the blockchain-based content caching market as a
Chinese restaurant game [9]. Based on the analysis of the Nash
Equilibrium (NE) of the game, we propose a decentralized
NE algorithm using sequential best response. The simulation
results demonstrate the efficiency and reliability of the proposed
decentralized NE searching algorithm.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND DESIGN APPROACH
A. Network Structure
We consider a hierarchical wireless network (e.g., an ultra
dense small cell network), where N CPs offer a static, homoge-
neous catalog of contents, K={1, . . . ,K}, to mobile users. M
edge nodes, i.e., the SCBSs and user-deployed Wi-Fi APs, work
as the proactive CHs in the network. We assume that the mobile
users are indifferent in choosing the services of any CP, and
each user randomly subscribes to one of the CPs with a flat-rate
subscription payment for the full access to K. We also consider
that the frequency of user demands for the contents remains the
same for a sufficiently long period. Then, after arranging the
contents in K in a descending order of their popularity, we can
use the Zipf distribution to model the probability of a content
being requested during a given time [10]:
pk =
k−β∑K
k=1 k
−β
, (1)
where the coefficient β reflects how skewed the distribution is.
We assume that a CH m chooses to cache only one content
from one CP during a certain period, mainly due to the
storage/computation limit. In return, the corresponding CP does
not pay the CH for merely prefetching contents, but promises
to offer reward according to the number of offloaded deliveries
made by the CH to the mobile users. We also assume that the
price of delivery offloading may differ for each CP. As shown in
Figure 1, the transactions occur only from the mobile users to
the CPs and from the CPs to the CHs. In this way, the caching
process is kept transparent to the mobile users for most of the
time, except the final content delivery stage from the CHs to
the mobile users.
B. Blockchain for a Distributed Cache-delivery Market
We employ the virtual P2P blockchain network as the
backbone of the decentralized content delivery market (see
Figure 1). An entity (e.g., a CP, a CH or a mobile user) i
in the wireless network maps itself as a node in the blockchain
network based on a pair of asymmetric keys, namely, a secret
key ski and a public key pki. Let H(·) denote a collision-
resistant, irreversible hash function. Node i identifies itself on
the blockchain by a unique “transaction address”,H(pki), using
the hashcode of its public key. We consider that all payments
are made in blockchain tokens (c.f., Ethers of the Ethereum
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Fig. 1. Illustration of payment flow and blockchain network structure for
proactive caching in a hierarchical wireless network.
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Fig. 2. Data structures for constructing a blockchain. (a) Data fields in a single
transaction. (b) Blockchain as a hash linked list of blocks.
network [7]). Then, the two types of transactions in the caching
market can be abstracted as follows (see also Figure 2(a)):
Definition 1 (Transaction). A transaction txi,j from node i
to node j on the blockchain can be represented by a 4-tuple:
txi,j = 〈H(pki),H(pkj), di,j , σi〉, where
• H(pki) and H(pkj) are the addresses of nodes i and j,
• di,j is the payload data specifying the payment value and
the auxiliary information (e.g., the content ID), and
• σi is the publicly verifiable digital signature of node i
using the secret key ski, namely, σi = Sign(ski, di,j).
A node issues a new transaction by broadcasting it to the
entire blockchain network with an off-the-shelf P2P protocol
(e.g., Whisper in Ethereum [7]). To further maintain a trust-
worthy and strictly-ordered log of transactions, the blockchain
network records the transactions in a chain of “blocks”, where
each block contains a unique set of transactions. By abstracting
away the implementation details, we define the data structure of
the block and the blockchain as follows (see also Figure 2(b)):
Definition 2 (Block). A block Bt can be represented by a 5-
tuple: Bt = 〈t, T X t, (pkm, σm), H(Bt), H(Bt−1)〉, where
• t is the ID (i.e., timestamp) of block Bt in the blockchain.
• T X t = {tx1, . . . , txl} is a set of unique transactions that
do not conflict with the transactions in B0 to Bt−1.
• (pkm, σm) contains the public key and the signature of
node m that publishes the block. σm = Sign(skm, T X t).
• H(Bt) andH(Bt−1) are the heads (i.e., hashcodes) of the
current block and the precedent block at t−1. H(Bt) =
H(t‖T X t‖(pkm, σm)‖H(Bt−1)).
Definition 3 (Blockchain). A blockchain C(t)= {B0, . . . , Bt}
is a sequence (i.e., linked list) of blocks indexed in a strictly
increasing time order. B0 is an arbitrary block known as the
genesis block of C(t), and Bt is known as the head of C(t).
With a chain of blocks linked by the block heads (i.e.,
hashcodes), a node have to modify every subsequent block
if it wants to forge any transaction in a block stored at the
local replica of the blockchain. Therefore, if the network adopts
a reliable consensus mechanism to coordinate the states of
the local replicas of the blockchain, the blockchain works
as a tamper-proof public database of the transactions in the
content delivery market [6]. Then, each CH can easily count
the frequency of requests for a certain content k ∈ K by
incrementally querying the blockchain about the related new
transactions sent by the mobile users. The CHs may use the
observed request frequencies to estimate the content popularity
distribution in (1), and thus are able to autonomously choose the
contents to cach according to the demand state in the market.
We consider that the CHs and CPs work as the full (con-
sensus) nodes and participate in the consensus process of the
blockchain network. The mobile devices work as lightweight
nodes and only issue requests for content delivery. Instead of
relying on the computation-intensive protocol using Proof of
Work (PoW) [6], we adopt a PoS-based consensus mechanism
from the Ouroboros protocol [8]. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the consensus nodes are equipped with roughly
synchronized clocks. A new block is generated in a slotted
manner with a fixed time interval. The PoS scheme facilitates
an uncompromisable random leader-election process at each
time slot to designate a unique consensus node for block
generation. To ensure the sustainability of the proactive caching
eco-system, we make the following assumptions regarding the
token supply mechanism of the blockchain:
• Each CP is assigned a sufficient amount of tokens at B0.
• New tokens are supplied to the blockchain only through a
fixed-amount reward for generating every new block.
• The CPs provide a fixed exchange rate between the tokens
and the fiat money for the CHs and the mobile users.
• The transaction fee (c.f., gas in Ethereum [7]) is negligible.
From [8], we introduce the formal definition of the leader-
election process for block generation with PoS as follows.
Definition 4. Assume that at time slot st the stakes held by the
M+N consensus nodes are static and measured by u(st) =
[u1(st), . . . , uM+N (st)]
⊤. A leader-election process consists of
a distribution D and a deterministic function F (·) such that,
with a random seed ρ←D, F (u, ρ, st) outputs a unique leader
index m (1≤m≤M+N ) for block generation with probability
pwinm (st) =
um(st)∑M+N
i=1 ui(st)
. (2)
The random variable m←F (S, ρ, st) is independent of st.
The PoS-based election scheme can be implemented by
a standard Follow-the-Satoshi (FtS) algorithm [8]. The FtS
resembles the process of biased coin-tossing and randomly
selects a leader’s address. This is achieved through indexing
a sub-set of tokens controlled by the consensus nodes (i.e,
stakeholders) and tracking the owner’s address of a random
token index1. The randomness of token selection is guaranteed
by the seeding function ρ←D, which is implemented using
the hashcode of the precedent block head, i.e., σ←H(Bst−1).
Here, H(·) is treated as a trusted uniform random oracle [8]
and σ is used to determine the random token index (e.g., with
a simple modulo operation). When all the consensus nodes are
honest, the proposed PoS scheme is able to avoid the inherent
inefficiency of PoW due to “block mining” competition [6] such
as computational resource consumption and block orphaning.
Let an epoch define a fixed time interval consisting of T
time slots. Instead of using the balance of each stakeholder
as its stake in (2) (c.f., [8]), we measure the stake of each
CH by its delivery reward collected in the latest epoch. Such
design incentivizes the CHs to stay active online, since a CH
no longer receives any profit by only holding the tokens. On the
other hand, we consider that the CPs’ stakes are proportional to
the amount of unconfirmed payment for content delivery in the
last epoch. When the CHs fail to complete the delivery tasks
or when pending transactions accumulate due to the Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks by malicious CHs, such design ensures
the CPs to take control of the block generation process with
high probability. Thereby, the blockchain lays the foundation
for implementing a secured decentralized caching market.
C. Caching and Delivery Based on Smart Contracts
Now, we address the issues of autonomous content delivery
and truthfulness enforcement with smart contracts [7]. From
Section II, we identify two stages, namely, the prefetching
and the delivering stages, in the content delivery process and
implement for each stage a group of smart contracts [11]. At
the prefetching stage, the smart contract is used by the CPs and
CHs for negotiating about the assignment of offloaded contents.
As shown in Figure 3, a CP n posts for each content k∈K an
order for caching by deploying a corresponding smart contract,
which specifies the price, on,k, for one successfully offloaded
delivery in the future. An interested CH m may respond to CP
n by calling the function offer for caching for content k and
sending a deposit to the smart contract. Consequently, an event
response is fired by the smart contract to notify CP n about the
response from CH m. We consider that a CP is able to register
more than one CHs for the delivery task (see the “crowdfund
contract” in Ethereum [11] for example). CP n confirms to
choose CH m by calling a registering function of the smart
contract. Then, it transfers a copy of content k to CH m with
third-party methods. To get refunded, CH m has to provide CP
n an interactive Proof of Retrievability (PoR) [12] for content
k in the form of a series of Merkle proofs [12]. After verifying
the PoR, CP n orders to refund the deposit to CH m. At the
end of each epoch, the existing contracts are destroyed by the
1FtS can be performed in advance at st−1 by a smart contract through
executing a random search in the Merkle tree of the related stake deposits. See
https://github.com/Realiserad/fts-tree for a simplified implementation.
CP
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Fig. 3. Sequence diagram of the content prefetching contract.
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Fig. 4. Sequence diagram of the content delivery contract.
CPs to avoid unresolved transactions. A set of new contracts in
the same form are deployed at the beginning of the next epoch.
At the delivering stage, CP n posts for each content k∈K an
order for delivery by deploying a smart contract, which works
as an escrow account to ensure that the payment by CP n is
made only when the delivery is successful. When a CH m
responds by calling the function offer for delivery, it sends a
security deposit to the smart contract. CP n evenly distribute
the delivery tasks among the responding CHs and notifies the
smart contract to register each CH m for the delivery task.
On the other hand, the payment of CP n for the delivery,
on,k, is also held by the smart contract until the target mobile
user provides the interactive PoR of content k to CP n. To
prevent the CHs and the flat-rate mobile users jointly cheating
for the delivery reward without actually delivering the content,
the smart contracts require that the mobile users provide the
PoR within a certain delay to confirm the content reception.
Otherwise, the contract will rollback and CP n will receive
CH m’s security deposit as a punishment. Such design ensures
that without a locally stored content copy, a mobile user is not
able to obtain the PoR from the CH due to transmission delay.
Finally, the content delivery contract is also updated at the
beginning of each epoch to remove the unfinished transactions.
III. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED CONTENT CACHING GAME
A. Caching Strategies with PoS-Based Block Generation
We consider that during each epoch, a total number of L
users request content delivery in the network. Since the users
are indifferent in subscribing to any CP for the same content
service, from (1), the expected number of requests for content k
in CP n during the epoch can be written as L(n, k)=LN−1pk.
Assume that a subset of CHs, Mn,k, have cached the ready-to-
deliver copies of content k provided by CP n. Again, if each
CP evenly distributes the delivery tasks among the responding
CHs, the expected number of delivery tasks assigned to CHm∈
Mn,k can be expressed as Lm(n, k) = LN
−1M−1n,kpk, where
Mn,k is the size of Mn,k and
∑N
n=1
∑K
k=1Mn,k = M . By
adopting the strategy of best-effort delivery, CH m offloads all
the delivery tasks assigned by CP n. Then, for a given sub-set of
CHs caching content k for CP n, Mn,k, the expected delivery
reward received by CH m (m∈Mn,k) can be expressed as:
rdm(n, k) = on,kLm(n, k) = on,kLN
−1M−1n,kpk. (3)
If CH m is selected as the block generation leader at one
epoch, it also receives a fixed reward for generating T new
blocks. Let λ denote the total block generation reward in an
epoch. According to Section II-B, the probability for CH m to
be elected in the next epoch is determined by the ratio between
its own delivery reward and the sum of the delivery reward
collected by all the CHs in the current epoch. By (2) and (3),
for CH m caching content k from CP n, the expected block
generation reward to be collected in the next epoch is
rmm(n, k) = λ
on,kLm(n, k)∑N
i=1
∑K
j=1
∑
l∈M(i,j) oi,jLl(i, j)
, (4)
where Ll(i, j) is the expected number of tasks assigned to CH
l for delivering content j for CP i.
Now, we can define the action of CH m in an epoch as
the pair of the selected CP and content, i.e., am = (n, k). We
note that the expected reward provided by CP n for delivering
content k is evenly distributed to the set of corresponding CHs,
Mn,k. Then, the payoff for CH m to take action am = (n, k)
can be obtained by adding up (3) and (4) as follows:
rm(am) =
on,kLpk
NMn,k
+ λ
on,kpk
Mn,k
∑N
i=1
∑K
j=1 oi,jpj
, (5)
where owning to the adjusted stakes based on the unspent
reward held by the CPs,
∑N
i=1
∑K
j=1 oi,jpj is independent of
Mi,j . Following the proposed mechanism of stake evaluation,
the payoff of a CH in (5) only depends on the joint action of the
CHs at the current epoch. Thereby, we are ready to investigate
the caching strategy selection of the CHs through modeling the
caching market as a non-cooperative game.
B. Caching Market as a Chinese Restaurant Game
Let A= {(n, k) : 1≤ n≤N, 1≤ k ≤K} denote the set of
actions (i.e., CP-content choices) for CH m ∈M = {m : 1≤
m≤M}, and a=[a1, . . . , aM ]
⊤ denote the vector of the CHs’
joint actions. We can define the non-cooperative caching game
among the CHs as a 3-tuple: G=〈M,A, {rm(a)}m∈M,am∈A〉.
We define the grouping of actions as the vector of the numbers
of the CHs choosing the same action given a joint action a:
gM(a) = [M1,1, . . . ,Ma, . . . ,MN,K ]
⊤. From (5), we define
the reward potential of each action as Rn,k=on,kpk. Then, for
CH m choosing a=(n, k), when fixing the other CHs’ actions,
we can rewrite (5) as:
rm(a)=r(Ra,Ma)=
L
N
Ra
Ma
+
λ∑N
i=1
∑K
j=1 Ri,j
Ra
Ma
. (6)
Since r(Ra,Ma) is a decreasing function of Ma, Ma reflects
the impact of the negative network effect on CH m’s payoff
for choosing action a. By inspecting the first order derivative
of r(Ra,Ma) with respect to Ra, we can easily show that
r(Ra,Ma) is an increasing function of Ra. Then, game G is a
typical Chinese restaurant game [9], where A can be compared
to the table set in a restaurant, and Ra andMa can be compared
to the size and the customer number of table a, respectively.
Let a−m denote the adversaries’ actions with respect to CH
m. Let gM(a−m)= [M
−m
1,1 , . . . ,M
−m
N,K]
⊤ denote the outcome
of action grouping for a−m, whereM
−m
n,k is the number of CHs
except CH m choosing action (n, k). Then, we can define the
Best Response (BR) of CH m to a−m as:
BRm(a−m)=BRm (gM(a−m))=argmax
a∈A
r(Ra,M
−m
a +1).
(7)
Based on (7), we can define the NE of game G in the form of
the simultaneous best response as follows.
Definition 5. A joint CH action a∗ = (a∗m, a
∗
−m) is an NE of
game G, if ∀m ∈ M, the following holds:
a∗m=BRm (g
∗
M(a−m))=argmax
a∈A
r(Ra,M
∗,−m
a +1), (8)
where g∗M(a−m) is the outcome of action grouping for a
∗
−m.
C. Nash Equilibrium of the Caching Game
After reformulating the payoff of a CH m with action a =
(n, k) as a function of Ra and Ma in (6), we note that the CHs
choosing the same action receive an identical payoff. Then, we
can show that game G is an exact potential game.
Theorem 1. G is an exact potential game and admits at least
one pure-strategy NE.
Proof. We define the following potential function (i.e., Rosen-
thal’s potential function [13]) of a=(am, a−m) in game G:
φ(a) =
∑
a∈A
Ma∑
i=1
r(Ra, i), (9)
where Ma is given by the action grouping gM of a =
(am= a, a−m). If CH m unilaterally switches its action from
am = (n, k) to a
′
m = (n
′, k′), the change only affects the
CHs that adopt actions am and a
′
m. Thus, we obtain a new
grouping of actions gM(a
′) = [M ′1,1, . . . ,M
′
N,K ]
⊤, where the
only difference from gM(a) is that Mam = M
′
am
+ 1 and
Ma′m =M
′
a′m
−1. Then, we obtain
φ(am, a−m)− φ(a
′
m, a−m)
=
(
Mam∑
i=1
r(Ram , i) +
Ma′m∑
i=1
r(Ra′m , i)
)
−
(
Mam−1∑
i=1
r(Ram , i)
+
Ma′m
+1∑
i=1
r(Ra′m , i)
)
= r(Ram ,Mam)− r(Ra′m ,Ma′m+1)
= rm(am, a−m)− rm(a
′
m, a−m).
(10)
By Definition 52 in [13], game G is an exact potential game.
Then, Theorem 1 immediately follows Theorem 53 in [13].
Algorithm 1 Equilibrium Strategy Searching
Require: Randomly initialize a(0) = [a1(0), . . . , am(0)]
⊤;
1: while a(t) not converged do
2: for CH m ∈ M do
3: rm ← 0;
4: for a ∈ A do
5: if r(Ra,M
−m
a + 1) > rm then
6: am ← a, rm ← r(Ra,M
−m
a + 1);
7: end if
8: end for
9: am(t)← am;
10: end for
11: t← t+ 1;
12: end while
Corollary 1. For game G, the asynchronous/sequential best-
response dynamics converge with probability one to a pure NE.
Proof. Given Theorem 1, namely, G is an exact potential game,
Corollary 1 follows Theorem 143 in [13].
Considering the asynchronous nature of the caching choice
selection based on the blockchain, we propose in Algorithm 1
the asynchronous best-response algorithm for equilibrium strat-
egy searching in the content market game G. By Corollary 1,
the proposed strategy searching scheme in Algorithm 1 is
guaranteed to converge to a pure-strategy NE.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We first consider a network of N = 3 CPs with a catalog
of K = 6 contents. There are L = 200 mobile users in
the network and the skewness of the popularity distribution
in (1) is set to β = 1. We first consider that the delivery
rewards are identical for all the CP-content pairs. In Figure 5,
we compare the performance of the proposed best-response
strategy searching scheme in Algorithm 1 with that of the
random content selection and that of the centralized payoff op-
timization, respectively. The result for random content selection
is obtained with Monte Carlo simulation. As we can observe in
Figures 5(a) and 5(b), the performance of the proposed caching
strategy searching algorithm significantly outperforms that of
random content selection in both the CHs’ average payoff
and the total number of offloaded deliveries. However, the
gap of performance between the centralized optimum and the
proposed algorithm indicates that the “pure price of anarchy”
is unnegligable for the caching game G. Theoretically, from
the individual payoff function given by (6), we can re-interpret
the caching game G as a singleton congestion game [13]. Then,
without coordination, the CHs may be reluctant to offer caching
services to the CP-content pairs that pay less for delivery,
although by doing so they are able to increase the social welfare
of the CHs. Instead, sharing the delivery demands with other
CHs for the CP-content pairs with higher reward potential will
lead to a higher individual payoff.
In Figure 6, we study the impact of the CPs’ rewarding
scheme on the CHs’ NE strategies. For ease of exposition, we
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Fig. 5. (a) Average payoff of the CHs vs. number of CHs in the network. (b)
Number of offloaded content deliveries to the CHs vs. number of CHs.
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Fig. 6. (a) Action grouping results with different rewarding schemes. (b) Payoff
comparison of action groups with different rewarding schemes.
consider a network of 2 CPs with 4 contents, 24 CHs and
200 mobile users. We consider 3 pricing schemes: (a) the CPs
offering uniform reward for each content, i.e., on,k=on′,k′ for
all feasible n, n′, k, k′ (the blue bars in Figure 6); (b) the CPs
offering different reward to make the reward potential identical,
namely, on,kpk=on′,k′pk′ for all feasible n, n
′, k, k′ (the green
bars in Figure 6); (c) discriminative reward with o2,k=2o1,k for
all feasible k (the red bars in Figure 6). As shown in Figure 6,
the reward pricing scheme with identical reward potential is
able to achieve better fairness among the CHs, and the CHs
are more willing to serve the caching and delivery tasks for the
less popular contents. On the other hand, by increasing the level
of delivery reward, a CP is able to attract more CHs for its own
traffic offloading (see the red bars in Figures 6(a)). We also note
in Figure 6(b) that when one CP increases its delivery reward,
the payoffs of the CHs at the NE will ultimately increase.
This indicates that the CPs are at a higher cost if one of them
unilaterally tries to improve its delivery efficiency.
V. CONCLUSION
We have designed an decentralized proactive caching system
in a hierarchical wireless network based on blockchains, which
enables the cache helpers to autonomously adapt their strate-
gies without a centralized auditing body. We have designed
several smart contacts to enable autonomous caching-delivery
task assignment and enforce truthfulness of different parties
in the network. We have designed an incentive-compatible
consensus mechanism for the blockchain based on proof-of-
stake to encourage the cache helpers to stay active in service
online. We have modeled the caching system as a Chinese
restaurant game and further shown that it is an exact potential
game. We have proposed a decentralized strategy searching
algorithm based on asynchronous best response for the cache
helpers to learn their NE strategies. The numerical simulation
results have demonstrated both the efficiency and the reliability
of the proposed proactive caching scheme.
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